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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 What is the relationship between the First Amendment right  
to expressive association and the Fourteenth Amendment right to 
vote? It’s closer than you probably think. The Supreme Court em-
ploys a balancing test in constitutional challenges to a wide variety of 
election practices, including ballot access rules, blanket primaries, 
and voter identification. This standard is commonly referred to as 
“Anderson-Burdick” for the two main cases from which it derives, 
Anderson v. Celebrezze1 and Burdick v. Takushi.2 Recent lower court 
decisions have applied this test in constitutional challenges to state 
laws restricting same day registration,3 provisional voting,4 and early 
voting.5   
 The Anderson-Burdick standard is the offspring of a union be-
tween the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote and the First 
Amendment right of association.6 This Article explores the origins, 
development, and subsequent obscuration of the relationship be-
tween these two rights. It argues for a renewed recognition of the vot-
ing–association link when it comes to the burdens on voting chal-
lenged in the current generation of voting rights litigation.  
 Central to this story are two opinions by Justice John Paul Ste-
vens, one written early in his tenure on the Supreme Court and the 
other near the end. The first opinion is Anderson, a challenge to bal-
lot access restrictions that were used to exclude independent candi-
date John Anderson from Ohio’s 1980 presidential ballot. Anderson 
                                                                                                                                       
 Charles W. Ebersold and Florence Whitcomb Ebersold Professor of Constitutional 
Law, The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law. The author thanks Rebecca Bar-
nard and Hayden Capace for their research assistance. 
 1. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
 2. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).  
 3. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015) (mem.); Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. 
Husted, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014), stay granted, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (mem.). 
 4. Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 5. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 6. This Article addresses the relationship between voting and the right to expressive 
association, not to be confused with the very different right to intimate association. See 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (distinguishing the two rights).  
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and his supporters brought a hybrid claim, asserting both First 
Amendment associational rights and Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection rights.7 The Court struck down Ohio’s ballot access re-
strictions, citing the risk of discrimination “against those candidates 
and—of particular importance—against those voters whose political 
preferences lie outside the existing political parties.”8 The Court thus 
suggested that restrictions on voting implicate First Amendment as-
sociational rights, insofar as it involves individual voters joining to-
gether with like-minded others as well as with political parties repre-
senting their views.   
 A quarter-century later, in Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board,9 the Court upheld Indiana’s voter ID law against a facial chal-
lenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Stevens’ lead opin-
ion adopts the balancing test articulated in Anderson and refined in 
Burdick to alleged burdens on voting.10 The dissenting Justices ap-
plied the same standard but reached a different conclusion. Since 
Crawford, lower courts have consistently used this standard in con-
stitutional challenges to a wide variety election administration prac-
tices. But as in Crawford, plaintiffs have based their claims primarily 
on the Equal Protection Clause and not the First Amendment, de-
spite the Anderson-Burdick standard’s roots in the right of expressive 
association.11 
 This Article urges recovery of the lost linkage between the First 
Amendment right of expressive association and the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to vote. Voting restrictions implicate expressive 
association to the extent they prevent voters from joining together 
with like-minded voters, candidates, and political parties. The First 
Amendment provides an appropriate vehicle for voting claims be-
cause it acknowledges the risk that the party in power will abuse its 
authority to impede association by voters favoring its rival. By af-
firming the centrality of intermediary organizations—especially po-
litical parties—the right of association affirms a decidedly pluralist 
perspective in democracy.12   
 Reviving the voting-association link would cast recent election 
administration cases, including Crawford and its lower-court proge-
ny, in a different light—one that more accurately reflects the real-
world dynamic in these cases. Disputes over voting rules are not 
                                                                                                                                       
 7. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 783 (1983). 
 8. Id. at 793-94.  
 9. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).  
 10. Id. at 189-91.  
 11. See infra Part II.   
 12. For an elaboration of this perspective, see generally BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY 
MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM QUANDARY (2015).  
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simply or even mainly about an individual’s right to cast a ballot 
without impediment. They are better understood as inter-party dis-
putes, in which political insiders seek to block political outsiders from 
aggregating their votes so as to challenge the dominant group. Like 
the seminal First Amendment association cases of the McCarthy and 
civil rights eras, recent voting controversies center on the risk that 
those in power will suppress groups challenging that power—be it 
the Communist Party in the 1950s, the NAACP in the 1960s, inde-
pendent-minded voters in 1980, or Democrats in Texas today. View-
ing the right of association as a component of the right to vote allows 
us to understand the constitutional problems inherent when political 
insiders manipulate election rules to stymie those collectively seeking 
to challenge their power.  
 This Article is not the first to suggest a link between the First 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote. Abner 
Greene,13 Lori Ringhand,14 and Janai Nelson15 are among those who 
have written on the subject, as have I.16 But most previous scholar-
ship on the subject focuses on free speech rather than association. 
The leading exception is Guy Charles who thoroughly explored the 
relationship between voting and associational rights in a 2003 arti-
cle.17 My account differs from his in two respects. First, Professor 
Charles understood the Anderson line of cases as resting on the First 
Amendment right of association instead of the Equal Protection 
Clause. I view equal protection and association as mutually reinforc-
ing. Second, Professor Charles emphasized racial association, while 
this Article sees political parties as the central association in con-
temporary politics and the constitutional law of elections.18  
 What are the implications of recognizing that voting is a form of 
association protected by the First Amendment? Reconnecting voting 
and association would reframe the central issue in future constitu-
tional litigation. It would thus lead to a sharpened understanding of 
                                                                                                                                       
 13. See ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL 
BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 132-33 (2001); Abner S. Greene, Is There a First 
Amendment Defense for Bush v. Gore?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1643 (2005). 
 14. See Lori A. Ringhand, Voter Viewpoint Discrimination: A First Amendment Chal-
lenge to Voter Participation Restrictions, 13 ELECTION L.J. 288 (2014).  
 15. See Janai S. Nelson, The First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Felon Disen-
franchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65 FLA. L. REV. 111 (2013).  
 16. See Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequali-
ty, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2410 (2003). 
 17. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amend-
ment Right of Association, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1209 (2003).  
 18. Dan Lowenstein also addressed associational rights in an excellent article written 
more than two decades ago, although his focus was on then-recent decisions according  
associational rights to political parties. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of 
Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741 (1993). I address Profes-
sor Lowenstein’s views in Part III, infra.  
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the injury that the now ubiquitous Anderson-Burdick standard is de-
signed to prevent. The State would have a heavier burden of justifi-
cation to the extent that election rules have the effect of discriminat-
ing against voters supporting the opposing party. Associational rights 
provide an appropriate vehicle for understanding voting injuries, in-
cluding not only ballot access and blanket primary issues to which 
the First Amendment has traditionally been deployed, but also elec-
tion administration controversies to which it has not. Future litigants 
challenging burdens on voting should therefore add the First 
Amendment association claims to their arsenal. Doing so would hone 
in on the real injury in the current generation of voter ID, early vot-
ing, provisional voting, and voter registration cases: preventing non-
dominant political parties and their supporters from challenging the 
party in power.  
 Part II of this Article traces the roots of the First Amendment 
right to expressive association, starting with the mid-century cases 
involving the NAACP and Communist Party and proceeding through 
later decisions involving compelled association and campaign finance 
regulation. Part III examines the relationship between voting and 
the associational rights through a close analysis of cases connecting 
these two rights, as well as more recent cases that overlook this con-
nection. Part IV proposes the re-linking of voting and associational 
rights, arguing for a refinement of the Anderson-Burdick doctrine to 
focus on the disparate impact on non-dominant parties, and tracing 
how this refinement would play out in constitutional challenges to 
present-day voting restrictions.   
II.   THE ROOTS OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION 
 One of the leading statements of the core value underlying the 
First Amendment appears in Justice Thurgood Marshall’s opinion for 
the Court in Police Department v. Mosley.19 “[A]bove all else,” he 
wrote, “the First Amendment means that government has no power 
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”20 The Court has reiterated this admonition 
many times, doubling down on it in recent First Amendment cases.21 
As Justice Scalia put it in one of his last dissents: “[T]he First 
                                                                                                                                       
 19. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 20. Id. at 95. For the leading scholarly exposition of this idea, see Kenneth L. Karst, 
Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26-29 (1975) 
(discussing Mosley); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 
1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 273-80 (discussing Mosley). I have expounded on the centrality of 
equality under the First Amendment at length. See Tokaji, supra note 16.  
 21. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (showing content-
discriminatory sign regulations are subject to strict scrutiny).  
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Amendment is a kind of Equal Protection Clause for ideas.”22 It 
guards against government officials misusing their power to suppress 
points of view they disfavor. Most conspicuously, it prevents the dom-
inant political group from trying to silence dissident groups that 
threaten its grip on power.  
 This conception of the First Amendment finds its most fulsome 
expression in the decisions in which the Supreme Court developed 
the right of association. From its beginnings, the main beneficiaries 
of this right have been groups advancing a political viewpoint contra-
ry to that espoused by the powers-that-be.23 The Supreme Court de-
veloped the First Amendment right of association in a series of mid-
century cases, most of them arising from governmental interference 
with two types of groups.   
 One line of cases involves the NAACP and other groups advocat-
ing for civil rights in the South. The first and most important of these 
decisions was NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.24 An Alabama 
court had cited the NAACP for contempt after it refused to comply 
with an order that the group disclose its members in accordance with 
state law.25 In holding that the NAACP had a First Amendment right 
to resist disclosure, Justice Harlan wrote for the Court:  
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, par-
ticularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group asso-
ciation, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking 
upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assem-
bly. It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for 
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of 
the “liberty” assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.26  
 Compelled disclosure of the NAACP’s members, the Court con-
cluded, would paralyze its attempt to advocate for racial justice. This 
was an entirely realistic appraisal at the time, when threats and  
                                                                                                                                       
 22. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1680 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 23. There is a rich body of scholarly literature exploring the theory and doctrine of the 
First Amendment right to expressive association. For some leading examples, see Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 981 (2011); Victor Brudney, Association, 
Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1995); Erwin Chemer-
insky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
595 (2001); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: Theoretically and 
Empirically Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2014); William P. 
Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 68 (1986); Jason 
Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 645 (2002). I do not address most 
of this work in this brief Article, since my focus is primarily on the relationship between 
the rights of association and voting.    
 24. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).   
 25. Id. at 451. 
 26. Id. at 460 (citations omitted).  
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violence against those involved in the civil rights movement were 
routine in places like Alabama. Decisions following NAACP v. Ala-
bama alarmingly gave like protection from disclosure to other civil 
rights groups and their members.27 
 The other seminal line of expressive association cases involves  
the Communist Party and its members. Around the same time as  
the NAACP compelled disclosure cases, the Court decided two cases 
arising from convictions of Communist Party members. In Scales v. 
United States,28 the Court upheld the conviction of a district chair-
man who not only knew of its illegal activities but also “specifically 
intend[ed] to accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to 
violence.”29 By contrast, in Noto v. United States,30 the Court reversed 
a conviction of a party member whose specific intent to further illegal 
activities had not been proven. The upshot was that mere association 
with a political party, despite its illegal aims, was insufficient to con-
vict. Later cases expanded this protection beyond criminal cases, 
prohibiting the denial of other benefits such as employment31 or bar 
membership32 based on party membership alone. These cases thus 
prevent the government from imposing either criminal penalties or 
other sanctions based on one’s dissident political views absent evi-
dence of an intent to promote illegal activity. The chief concern is 
that government-targeting of unpopular groups would discourage 
people from joining, thus impoverishing public debate.  
 Other cases extend protection to people associating as a way to 
advance their political beliefs through litigation. In this area, too, the 
groundbreaking case arose from the civil rights movement. In 
NAACP v. Button,33 the Court struck down a Virginia law prohibiting 
lawyers from soliciting prospective clients, which had been used to 
stop the NAACP’s efforts to organize civil rights lawsuits. Justice 
Brennan’s opinion for the Court held that the litigation, in which the 
NAACP sought to engage, was not just a means of resolving private 
                                                                                                                                       
 27. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); see also Gibson v. Fla. Legislative  
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (holding that petitioner’s conviction for failing to 
release information contained in the membership was a violation of the right of association 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 28. 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
 29. Id. at 229 (second alteration in original) (quotation omitted). 
 30. 367 U.S. 290 (1961).  
 31. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 
U.S. 589 (1967); see also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (rejecting loyalty oath and 
prohibition on Communist Party membership for officeholders).  
 32. See Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971). 
But see Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) 
(upholding a bar question asking whether applicants had joined a group knowing of its 
objective to overthrow the government by violence and, if so, whether they had specific 
intent to advance those ends).   
 33. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).  
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disputes but also “a form of political expression.”34 While recognizing 
that the NAACP was “not a conventional political party,” its litiga-
tion sought to advance the collective interests of the African Ameri-
can community.35 Virginia’s law thus infringed upon the associational 
rights of the NAACP, as well as its members and its lawyers. Later 
cases extended this protection to other groups engaged in impact liti-
gation such as labor unions36 and advocates for reproductive rights.37 
The unifying theme is that the State may not prevent people from 
associating in pursuit of ideological goals through litigation.   
 The freedom to associate in pursuit of shared political goals some-
times includes the freedom not to associate as well. An example is 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, in which the Court held that 
public employees could not be compelled to support a labor union’s 
ideological activities, though they could be required to pay for the un-
ion’s collective bargaining services.38 The First Amendment’s protec-
tion against compelled association is not, however, absolute. In Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees,39 the Court held that the First Amend-
ment’s protections did not extend to a private club’s exclusion of 
women, which was a violation of a state civil rights statute, because 
the admission of women would do no discernible damage to the club’s 
expressive aims.40 On the other hand, the Court struck down the ap-
plication of a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.41 The Court accept-
ed the Boy Scouts’ claim that accepting gays would undermine its 
antigay message and, accordingly, infringe on its right to expressive 
association.42 The right to be free from compelled association thus 
                                                                                                                                       
 34. Id. at 429.  
 35. Id. at 431.  
 36. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine 
Workers, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967). 
 37. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). On the other hand, the same day it handed 
down Primus, the Court held in another case that states may prohibit solicitation of purely 
commercial offers of legal assistance. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).  
 38. 431 U.S. 209 (1977); see also Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1990) 
(finding that the bar association may require members to pay fees used for regulation of 
the profession, but not political advocacy). In recent years, the Roberts Court has extended 
the protection against compelled association further, requiring that workers “opt in” to 
support certain union political activities rather than allowing unions to charge them for 
such activities unless they “opt out.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. 
Ct. 2277, 2293 (2012). Currently before the Court is another First Amendment challenge to 
compelled support for a union’s collective bargaining services. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers 
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 2933 (2015) (granting certiorari petition).  
 39. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 40. Id. at 626-27. 
 41. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).  
 42. Id. at 648, 651; see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 
515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that a private group organizing a St. Patrick’s Day parade 
had a right to exclude a group with an antithetical message).  
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extends only to those whose participation would interfere with the 
group’s message.43 As with other cases involving associational rights, 
the central question in the compelled association cases is whether 
state action has impeded a group’s ability to express its ideological 
perspective.    
 Similar concerns are at play in cases involving campaign finance 
regulation, an area worthy of special note given its close connection 
to voting. Two aspects of campaign finance law implicate expressive 
association. The first is restrictions on political contributions, which 
Buckley v. Valeo44 famously distinguished from restrictions on ex-
penditures. While restrictions on the latter directly impede political 
speech, the Court reasoned, contribution limits are only a “marginal” 
restriction on speech.45 Buckley viewed contribution limits as mainly 
affecting association, rather than speech,46 and thus warranting less 
searching scrutiny than expenditure limits.47 The other aspect of 
campaign finance law implicating associational rights is compelled 
disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures. Since Buck-
ley, the Supreme Court has recognized that mandatory disclosure has 
the potential to chill would-be donors and spenders, subjecting such 
requirements to “exacting scrutiny.”48 While generally upholding dis-
closure requirements,49 the Court has recognized the need to accom-
modate groups and individuals that may suffer retaliation if contri-
butions are made public.50 Accordingly, it has held that individuals 
and groups may claim an exception where there is a “reasonable 
probability” that compelled disclosure will lead to threats, harass-
ment, or reprisals.51 Following NAACP v. Alabama, this test is 
grounded in recognition that compelled disclosure can paralyze non-
                                                                                                                                       
 43. Another example is California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000), 
discussed infra note 104.  
 44. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  
 45. Id. at 20-21.   
 46. Id. at 24-25 (“[T]he primary First Amendment problem raised by the [Federal 
Election Campaign] Act’s contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the 
contributor’s freedom of political association.”).  
 47. Id. at 25. Although Buckley itself is imprecise regarding the level of scrutiny, the 
Court later clarified that contribution limits need only be “closely drawn” to an important 
interest, while expenditure limits must satisfy strict scrutiny and be narrowly tailored to a 
compelling interest. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445 (2014); McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-88 (2000). 
 48. 424 U.S. at 64.   
 49. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.  
 50. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70-71.  
 51. Id. at 74. The Court later found this test satisfied in Brown v. Socialist Workers 
’74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 98-101 (1982). More recently, the Court has applied 
the same test to compelled disclosure of referendum signatories. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 
200-01 (2010). 
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mainstream political groups, whose fundraising and therefore ex-
pression may be stymied if their supporters’ identities are publicized.  
 Thus far, I have focused on cases that involve political association 
but do not directly concern the act of voting. There is, however, an-
other line of cases in which the Court has extended the right of ex-
pressive association to voters, candidates, and parties joining togeth-
er at the ballot box. Part III discusses those cases.  
III.   ASSOCIATION AND THE VOTE 
 The Supreme Court has long flirted with the idea that voting is a 
form of speech protected by the First Amendment, but has never 
adopted this position. It has, however, held that voting is a form of 
expressive association protected by the First Amendment.   
 Before exploring the connection between voting and association, it 
is worth considering the road not taken. The Court entertained the 
argument that voting was protected speech in Harper v. Virginia 
Board of Elections52 but wound up striking down the poll tax based 
solely on the fundamental right to vote under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.53 Justice Douglas’ opinion for the Court in Harper ob-
served that “[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to 
one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.”54 By 
denying the vote to citizens unable to pay the $1.50 poll tax, Virginia 
was effectively discriminating against poor people in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. The Harper plaintiffs argued that voting is 
speech protected by the First Amendment, but the Court declined to 
rule on that ground.55 Nor has it since then, though some Justices 
have occasionally toyed with the possibility.56 The Court’s closest 
brush with the idea since then was Bush v. Gore.57 That opinion  
silently borrows from First Amendment cases, looking with suspicion 
                                                                                                                                       
 52. 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966). For discussion of the drafting history of Harper, see 
RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM 
BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 36-38 (2003).  
 53. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665-70; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) 
(holding that restrictions on voting must be “carefully and meticulously scrutinized”  
because the right to vote is fundamental); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) 
(holding that voting is “a fundamental political right, because preservative [sic] of all 
rights”). 
 54. 383 U.S. at 668; accord id. at 665. 
 55. Id. at 665.  
 56. Most notable is Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer, in 
which he suggests that challenges to partisan gerrymandering might be grounded in the 
First Amendment. 541 U.S. 267, 314-17 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). This decision is 
addressed infra Part IV.  
 57. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 425 & n.52 
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing legal scholarship for the proposition that “voting is, 
among other things, a form of speech”).  
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on schemes given to government officials to regulate speech,58 but 
ultimately rested—at least explicitly—on the right to vote under the 
Equal Protection Clause.59  
 While not viewing voting as speech, the Court has, for decades, 
held that some aspects of voting are protected forms of association 
under the First Amendment. The first case to recognize the voting-
association link was Williams v. Rhodes,60 decided two years after 
Harper. Williams involved a challenge to Ohio’s requirement that 
new political parties file petition signatures, equal to fifteen percent 
of the ballots cast in the last gubernatorial election, by February in 
order to get on the presidential ballot.61 This restriction was challenged 
by the American Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party.62    
 In striking down Ohio’s restrictions, Justice Black’s opinion for the 
Court relied on both the Equal Protection Clause and the First 
Amendment. The Court cited the NAACP and Communist Party de-
cisions on freedom of association, extending their principle to state 
laws restricting political parties’ access to the ballot.63 The problem, 
according to the opinion, was that the law advantaged political insid-
ers over outsiders, “giv[ing] the two old, established parties a decided 
advantage over any new parties . . . and thus plac[ing] substantially 
unequal burdens on both the right to vote and the right to associ-
ate.”64 The Court thus required the State to provide a compelling in-
terest justifying its restriction and then proceeded to reject the 
State’s proffered justifications.65 Most significantly, it rejected the 
stated interest in favoring a two-party system on the ground that 
Ohio’s law went further, “favor[ing] two particular parties—the Re-
publicans and the Democrats—and in effect tends to give them a 
complete monopoly.”66 Without a sufficient interest to justify the law, 
Ohio’s ballot access restriction was held to impose an impermissible 
burden on voting and associational rights.67 
                                                                                                                                       
 58. Tokaji, supra note 16, at 2487-95; see also GREENE, supra note 13, at 132-33  
(discussing the suspicion of public officials discretion and the uncited First Amendment 
line of cases in Bush v. Gore). The Court has also considered the very different question of 
whether a legislator’s vote is speech protected by the First Amendment, holding it is not. 
Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350-51 (2011).   
 59. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05.   
 60. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).  
 61. Id. at 24-27.  
 62. Id. at 26.  
63.  Id. at 30, 31. 
64. Id. at 31.   
 65. Id. at 31-34.   
 66. Id. at 32.  
 67. Id. at 34. The Court proceeded to hold that the Independent Party was entitled to 
be placed on the ballot, but not the Socialist Labor Party, which had asked to be added to 
the ballot later, on the ground that this relief would be too disruptive. Id. at 34-35. Justice 
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 Williams was an important step forward in two respects. First, it 
explicitly recognized the link between the First Amendment right of 
expressive association and the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote. 
Second, Williams involved a positive claim to get something from the 
government, rather than a negative claim to be left alone. Most earli-
er cases involved the State’s unwanted government intrusion on the 
affected group’s liberty interest—for example, the government seek-
ing a membership list in NAACP v. Alabama or restricting solicita-
tion of clients in NAACP v. Button. By contrast, the Williams plain-
tiffs were demanding something from the State: a place on the ballot. 
That said, Williams is not as much of an extension of precedent as it 
might first appear. Some of the Communist Party cases likewise in-
volved an affirmative claim to something from the government—a job 
or, later, admission to the bar—that was denied on account of party 
affiliation. There is still a difference, however, in that these benefits 
were expressly denied on account of belief or association in the earli-
er cases. By contrast, Williams relied on the practical effect of the 
State’s restrictions on non-dominant political parties and their  
supporters.   
 Subsequent cases follow Williams in affirming the link between 
voting and association, while qualifying both rights. The Court would 
go on to uphold some restrictions on third party and independent 
candidates’ access to the ballot, such as reasonable signature and 
disaffiliation requirements.68 In other cases, it invalidated rules that 
imposed too great a burden on would-be voters or candidates, espe-
cially those seeking to challenge the two major parties’ grip on pow-
er.69 For example, in Kusper v. Pontikes, the Court struck down a re-
quirement that voters be disaffiliated from one party for at least 
twenty-three months before voting in the primary of another, finding 
it too great a restriction on voters associating with the party of their 
                                                                                                                                       
Douglas concurred, emphasizing the harm to dissident political parties from Ohio’s rule, 
but would have granted relief to the Socialist Labor Party as well. Id. at 35-41 (Douglas, J., 
concurring). Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment, grounding his reasoning in the 
First Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Equal 
Protection Clause. Id. at 41-48 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart and Chief Justice 
Warren dissented. Id. at 48 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 63 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).  
 68. See generally Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (upholding the requirement 
that candidates be disaffiliated from political parties for a year before running as inde-
pendents); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (upholding the requirement that third 
party and independent candidates obtain signatures from five percent of registered voters). 
 69. See e.g., Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) 
(striking down a requirement that new parties and independent candidates in Chicago 
obtain at least 25,000 petition signatures); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (striking 
down a $701.60 filing fee where there was no alternative means of getting on the primary 
ballot); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (striking down filing fees as high as $8900 to 
get on the primary ballot). 
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choice.70 Some of these cases emphasize equal protection, others free-
dom of association, but none of them question the link between these 
rights that Williams recognized.    
 A critical development in the law of voting and association was 
Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court in Anderson, another challenge 
to Ohio ballot access rules. A state statute required that independent 
presidential candidates file papers in late March, seventy-five days 
before the primary election and more than seven months before the 
general election.71 The plaintiffs were John Anderson, an independ-
ent candidate for President in 1980, and three voters supporting  
his candidacy.72   
 Justice Stevens’ opinion in Anderson solidifies and develops the 
link between voting and association. Because “a candidate serves as a 
rallying-point for like-minded citizens,” Justice Stevens wrote, re-
strictions on ballot access may hinder voters’ freedom to associate 
with both candidates of their choice and one another.73 The risk is 
particularly great where dominant parties make rules that exclude 
independent or minor party candidates. That does not mean that all 
state restrictions on ballot access are invalid. The Court reconciled 
Williams’ requirement of a compelling interest with the more lenient 
standard suggested in later decisions, by articulating a balancing 
test. As a practical matter, Justice Stevens’ opinion recognized that 
states must impose some regulations on elections. There is according-
ly no “litmus-paper test” for separating valid and invalid ones.74 
Courts should instead weigh the “character and magnitude” of the 
harm to First and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the “precise 
interest put forward by the State.”75 While “reasonable, nondiscrimi-
natory restrictions” are generally justified by the State’s “important 
regulatory interests,” stronger government interests are required to 
justify more serious burdens, including ones that are discriminatory.76    
 Anderson’s standard focuses mainly on the impact that the chal-
lenged practice has on voters favoring independent or non-dominant 
party candidates. At the center of the inquiry is the effect of the chal-
lenged practice on those likely to favor political outsiders. The Court 
emphasized that it is not just the “magnitude” or the burden but also 
its “character”77—or, as stated at the end of the opinion, not just the 
                                                                                                                                       
 70. 414 U.S. 51 (1973). 
 71. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 782-83 (1983).  
 72. Id. at 783.  
 73. Id. at 787-88.  
 74. Id. at 789.  
 75. Id.   
 76. Id. at 788. 
 77. Id. at 789.  
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“extent” of the burden but also its “nature”—that is critical.78 Espe-
cially problematic are burdens that “fall[] unequally on new or small 
political parties or on independent candidates,” because they “dis-
criminate[] against those candidates and—of particular importance—
against those voters whose political preferences lie outside the exist-
ing political parties.”79 This framing puts the challenged practice’s 
disparate impact on certain groups at the center of the analysis.  
Anderson does not require proof of a discriminatory purpose, though 
such evidence would presumably be relevant in illuminating the 
character of the burden on voting.  
 Applying its newly formulated standard, the Court concluded that 
Ohio’s early filing deadline had a “substantial impact” on the associa-
tional rights of independent-minded voters.80 By requiring independ-
ent candidates to file two and one-half months before the state pri-
mary, it would bar those driven to enter the fray by developments 
occurring during the parties’ nomination process. It therefore threat-
ened to deny an adequate choice to voters disaffected by and dissatis-
fied with the choices offered by the major parties.81 The Anderson 
Court proceeded to find the State’s interests inadequate to justify 
this burden. Especially significant is its discussion of Ohio’s asserted 
interest in promoting political stability. The Court rejected the idea 
that the “desire to protect existing political parties from competition” 
could justify restrictions on independent and minor-party candidates’ 
ballot access.82 Protecting the major parties from competition was not 
an acceptable reason for “the virtual exclusion of other political as-
pirants from the political arena.”83 Ohio’s rule was especially burden-
some, the Court recognized, because independent and minor-party 
candidates often start as a “dissident group” attempting to exert in-
fluence within a major party.84 To exclude them from the general 
election ballot through an extremely early filing deadline would deny 
such dissident groups any meaningful leverage.   
 In addition to providing a legal standard, Anderson deepened the 
connection between the rights of association and voting that Williams 
recognized. The Court expressly grounded its analysis in both, citing 
NAACP v. Alabama’s holding that association is a central aspect of 
the liberty protected by the First Amendment and Williams’ holding 
that voting and associational rights overlap when it comes to ballot 
                                                                                                                                       
 78. Id. at 806.  
 79. Id. at 793-94.  
 80. Id. at 790, 795. 
 81. Id. at 792.  
 82. Id. at 801, 805-06. 
 83. Id. at 802.  
 84. Id. at 805.  
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access.85 And in the concluding paragraph of its opinion, the Court 
stressed that its “primary concern was not the interest of candidate 
Anderson, but rather, the interests of the voters who chose to associ-
ate together to express their support for Anderson’s candidacy  
and the views he espouse[s].”86 This statement makes unmistakably 
clear that the Court viewed voting as a form of association, for which  
Anderson’s supporters collectively enjoyed constitutional protection.    
 The right that Anderson affirms is best understood as a hybrid, 
grounded in both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a footnote citing Williams, 
Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court explained that the Court’s 
holding was premised on both the First and Fourteenth Amendments: 
In this case, we base our conclusions directly on the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments and do not engage in a separate Equal 
Protection Clause analysis. We rely, however, on the analysis in a 
number of our prior election cases resting on the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These cases, applying the 
“fundamental rights” strand of equal protection analysis, have 
identified the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights implicated 
by restrictions on the eligibility of voters and candidates, and have 
considered the degree to which the State’s restrictions further le-
gitimate state interests.87 
 Professor Charles understands Anderson to ground the Court’s 
analysis in the right of association under the First Amendment  
instead of the right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The better interpretation, in my view, is 
that Anderson is grounded in both voting and associational rights. 
Here and elsewhere in the opinion, the Court expressly states it is 
relying on both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.88 Declining to 
engage in a “separate” equal protection analysis is not the same as 
rejecting the Equal Protection Clause as a source of the hybrid right 
it recognized. To the contrary, the Court elsewhere affirms that ballot 
access rules may affect both voting and associational rights. Ander-
son synthesizes associational and voting rights, rather than replacing 
the former with the latter.  
                                                                                                                                       
 85. Id. at 786-87.  
 86. Id. at 806 (emphasis added).  
 87. Id. at 786 n.7 (citations omitted). 
 88. The reference to the Fourteenth Amendment could be understood to refer to the 
Due Process Clause, which has long been thought to incorporate the First Amendment. 
But, Anderson’s references to the right to vote belie the argument that the Court was back-
ing away from the Equal Protection Clause, the primary textual source of that right. See 
also id. at 787 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968), for the proposition 
that voting and associational rights overlap when it comes to ballot access restrictions).  
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 The Court refined the Anderson voting-association standard in 
Burdick v. Takushi, upholding a challenge to Hawaii’s ban on write-
in voting.89 Justice White’s opinion for the majority unambiguously 
reaffirmed Anderson’s “flexible” standard, reiterating that courts 
should weigh the “character and magnitude” of the challenged re-
striction against the “precise interests put forward by the State.”90 It 
also quotes Anderson’s statement that “reasonable, nondiscriminato-
ry restrictions” may generally be supported by “the State’s important 
regulatory interests.”91 Burdick’s main doctrinal contribution is to 
clarify that only a restriction that is “severe” should receive strict 
scrutiny, requiring government to show it is narrowly tailored to a 
compelling interest.92 Finding the State’s prohibition on write-in vot-
ing to be “slight” in magnitude and “politically neutral” in character, 
Burdick held that the State’s interests in preventing factionalism 
and party raiding were sufficient to sustain it.93 While the dissenting 
opinion by Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Blackmun and Ste-
vens) thought the burden more serious and the state interests more 
modest than the majority,94 the dissent expressly agreed with the 
Court’s “careful statement . . . of the test to be applied.”95 Thus, all 
nine Justices in Burdick agreed on the constitutional standard.  
 Other cases apply Anderson’s standard to restrictions on minor 
parties’ access to the ballot. While usually exhibiting greater solici-
tude for the State’s interests, they do not change the standard or the 
hybrid nature of the right Anderson recognized. An example is Munro 
v. Socialist Workers Party,96 which upheld a state requirement that 
minor-party candidates receive at least one percent of primary votes 
to appear on the general election ballot. Another is Timmons v. Twin 
Cities Area New Party,97 upholding a state ban on “fusion” candida-
cies. Both cases find the burden on minor parties modest and the 
                                                                                                                                       
 89. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 90. 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).   
 91. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 438-40.  
 94. Id. at 442-50 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 445.  
 96. 479 U.S. 189, 193-99 (1986). 
 97. 520 U.S. 351, 356-70 (1997). 
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state interests adequate to justify that burden.98 Yet they apply the 
same basic framework that the Court adopted in Anderson, reaffirm-
ing its fusion of voting and association claims.  
 The Court would later extend Anderson’s reasoning to disputes 
between the major parties. The first and still most important case to 
do so was Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut.99 Justice Mar-
shall’s opinion for the Court struck down Connecticut’s prohibition on 
independent voters participating in primaries as applied to the state 
Republican Party, which had adopted a rule allowing independent 
voters to participate in its primary. At the time, Democrats controlled 
the state legislature and, in a party-line vote, refused to change state 
law to accommodate Republicans’ desire to include independents in 
their primary. Applying the Anderson standard, the Court concluded 
that the State had imposed an impermissible burden on association.100  
 Like the minor-party and independent-candidate decisions on 
which it builds, Tashjian reflects a concern with a dominant party 
seeking to diminish the strength of a rival group.101 Professor Low-
enstein has criticized Tashjian, partly on the ground that “the major 
parties are grown-ups who, generally speaking, can be expected to 
take care of themselves.”102 This may sometimes be true—but not al-
ways. After all, the dominant major party is more likely to have its 
grip on power threatened by the other major party than by minor 
                                                                                                                                       
 98. Munro defers to the State’s interests in avoiding voter confusion, ballot overcrowd-
ing, and frivolous candidacies. Timmons adds the interest in promoting “political stability” 
to the list of those that may justify ballot access restrictions. My two casebook co-authors, 
Rick Hasen and Dan Lowenstein, have disagreed over the import of Timmons. Professor 
Hasen criticizes Timmons for recognizing the preservation of the two-party system as a 
legitimate interest. See Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme 
Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political 
Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 367-71 (1997). Professor Lowenstein’s more sympa-
thetic account is that Timmons affirmed the interest in a healthy two-party system rather 
than the promotion of the two-party system (and thus the exclusion of minor parties) per 
se. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Legal Regulation and Protection of American Parties, in 
HANDBOOK OF PARTY POLITICS 456, 464 (Richard S. Katz & William Crotty eds., 2006). 
While the Hasen-Lowenstein disagreement is peripheral to this Article, I agree with Pro-
fessor Lowenstein’s understanding of Timmons. Whoever is right, Timmons reaffirms  
Anderson’s holding that there are limits on the major parties’ authority to restrict inde-
pendent and minor-party candidates’ ballot access. 520 U.S. at 367 (showing state interest 
in stability “does not permit a state to completely insulate the two-party system from mi-
nor parties’ or independent candidates’ competition and influence” (citing Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 802 (1983))).   
 99. 479 U.S. 208 (1986). 
 100. Id. at 213-25. But see Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (upholding semi-
closed primary system under which party members and independent voters could vote in 
party primary, but other parties’ members could not).  
 101. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Parti-
san Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (exploring the way 
dominant parties limit competition from weaker groups).  
 102. Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 1790.  
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parties or independent candidates. There was certainly a reasonable 
argument to be made for uniform rules in Tashjian, as Professor 
Lowenstein has observed.103 But there is also good reason for judicial 
skepticism, where one major party controls the machinery of gov-
ernment and uses that power to make life difficult for its main 
competitor.104  
 To recap, the Anderson-Burdick standard has been applied in a 
wide variety of electoral contexts, including state laws regulating bal-
lot access, restricting write-in voting, and determining who may vote 
in party primaries. These cases affirm, explicitly or implicitly, the 
link between voting and association recognized in Williams and de-
veloped in Anderson. For the most part, the cases in which the Court 
has found a violation are ones in which a dominant major party uses 
its power to impede association among voters favoring the other ma-
jor party, minor parties, or independent candidates.  
 The most recent doctrinal development involves a subject that, at 
first glance, seems quite dissimilar to the voting-association cases 
detailed above: voter identification. In Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board,105 a majority of Justices applied the Anderson-
Burdick standard to an Indiana law requiring most voters to present 
government-issued photo ID at the polls. Unlike ballot access cases 
such as Williams and Anderson, Crawford did not involve a claim 
that voters were denied their First Amendment right to associate 
                                                                                                                                       
 103. Id.  
 104. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 101, at 654-59. Some later cases involv-
ing major-party associational rights are more difficult to justify on this ground. The Court 
would later extend Anderson from inter-party to intra-party disputes in Eu v. San Francis-
co County Democratic Central Committee, striking down California’s ban on certain party 
endorsements and restrictions on internal party governance. 489 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1989). 
For a compelling critique of judicial intervention in this case, see Lowenstein, supra note 
18, at 1777-87. It is not obvious why judicial intervention is necessary, absent evidence 
that one faction of a party has been locked out of its deliberations, as were African Ameri-
cans from the Texas Democratic Party in the White Primary Cases. See id. at 1748-49. Also 
difficult to justify on this ground is the decision in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 
530 U.S. 567, 572-86 (2000), striking down a state blanket primary in which non-party 
members were allowed to vote in a party primary over the major parties’ objections. In 
contrast to Tashjian, this was not a case in which the dominant major party was frustrat-
ing voting and association rights of its main competitor. It was instead a dispute among 
different factions within the major parties, particularly the Republican Party. See Michael 
S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 164-65 
(2005). In a later case, Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 
552 U.S. 442, 449-59 (2008), the Court would uphold, against a facial challenge, a different 
kind of blanket primary—one in which all candidates appeared on the ballot with their 
party affiliation and the top two vote-getters, regardless of party, would proceed to the 
general election. This Article leaves to one side the difficult question what role courts 
should play in resolving intra-party disputes, a question thoughtfully and comprehensively 
addressed—with different answers—in the above articles by Professors Lowenstein and 
Kang. My focus here is on disputes between, not within, political parties. 
 105. 553 U.S. 181, 185-86, 189-91 (2008). 
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with a party, candidate, or other voters. The Crawford plaintiffs 
grounded their claim solely on the Fourteenth Amendment right to 
vote, not the right of association.   
 The Justices were divided into three groups in Crawford. The nar-
rowest ground for the decision appears in the lead opinion by Justice 
Stevens (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy). His 
legal analysis begins by noting that the Court of Appeals distin-
guished Harper, on the ground that voter ID is relevant to a voter’s 
qualifications to vote, while the poll tax was not.106 It proceeds to ap-
ply the constitutional standard of Anderson and its progeny, balanc-
ing the burden placed on voting against the precise interest put for-
ward by the State.107 According to Justice Stevens, the number of af-
fected voters was “small” and the “magnitude of the burden” uncer-
tain on the record before the Court.108 Although the plaintiffs assert-
ed that Indiana’s law would have a negative effect on indigent voters, 
evidence of an excessive burden on them or any other identifiable 
class of voters was lacking.109 Given the modest burden on voters, the 
State’s claimed interests in fraud prevention, voter confidence, and 
election modernization were sufficient to sustain the statute against 
a facial challenge.  
 Under Anderson and the voting-as-association cases that followed, 
the central question is the impact of the challenged law on supporters 
of a non-dominant party or candidate. Crawford’s discussion of this 
point is telling. Justice Stevens’ lead opinion observed that Indiana’s 
law was approved on a party-line vote, with Republicans uniformly 
supporting it and Democrats uniformly opposing it.110 From this fact, 
it could fairly be inferred that partisan considerations played a role 
in its passage. But the existence of such motivations—invariably pre-
sent in any law regulating elections—was insufficient to invalidate 
the law on its face. Justice Stevens explained: “[I]f a nondiscrimina-
tory law is supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifica-
tions should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests 
may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual  
legislators.”111   
 Justice Stevens’ opinion did not explain precisely what was meant 
by “nondiscriminatory,” but the context suggests that the negative 
effects of the law are paramount. This is consistent with Anderson 
and the other cases cited, which focus on the impact that a law has 
                                                                                                                                       
 106. Id. at 188. 
 107. Id. at 189-91.  
 108. Id. at 200.  
 109. Id. at 202.   
 110. Id. at 203.   
 111. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).  
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on voters favoring non-dominant parties or independent candidacies. 
It is also consistent with Justice Stevens’ view in partisan gerryman-
dering cases, in which he has advocated attention to “whether the 
plan has a significant adverse impact on an identifiable political 
group.”112 The Crawford record was conspicuously devoid of evidence 
that Indiana’s law would have a disproportionate impact on Demo-
crats compared to Republicans.113 The lead opinion suggests that this 
omission was a serious one, undercutting the suggestion that Indi-
ana’s law was discriminatory and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.  
 Justice Scalia’s concurrence (joined by Justices Thomas and Alito) 
purported to apply Anderson and Burdick, but read those cases dif-
ferently. He urged a “two-track approach,” applying strict scrutiny in 
cases where there is a severe burden and deferring to the states in 
other cases.114 As Justin Levitt has explained, Justice Scalia’s ap-
proach is more like a light switch, while that of the other Justices is 
more like a dimmer with the State’s burden of justification increasing 
with the burden on voters.115 Unlike the lead opinion—as well as the 
dissents—Justice Scalia would avoid any judicial inquiry into the 
“individual impacts” on voters.116 While this statement might be un-
derstood to imply that collective impacts are relevant, it appears that 
this group would find a severe burden only in cases where discrimi-
natory intent to disadvantage a particular group is proven.117   
 Justice Souter’s dissent (joined by Justice Ginsburg) applies the 
same standard as Justice Stevens, balancing the “character and 
magnitude” of the burden on voting against the “precise interests put 
forward by the state.”118 But Justice Souter found the burden on  
voters to be more substantial than the majority, focusing especially  
                                                                                                                                       
 112. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 751 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 113. 553 U.S. at 200-03.   
 114. Id. at 204-05 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 115. Justin Levitt, Crawford--More Rhetorical Bark Than Legal Bite?, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUSTICE (May 2, 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/crawford-more-rhetorical-
bark-legal-bite. 
 116. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 117. Id. at 207. This position is difficult to square with earlier cases in the Anderson 
line, in which the Court struck down restrictions on ballot access without finding an intent 
to disadvantage a particular group. A cryptic footnote in Justice Scalia’s opinion suggests 
that economic burdens on voting—like the poll tax or filing fees—may warrant heightened 
scrutiny even without discriminatory intent. See id. at 207 n.* (“[I]t suffices to note that we 
have never held that legislatures must calibrate all election laws, even those totally unre-
lated to money, for their impacts on poor voters or must otherwise accommodate wealth 
disparities.”) (second emphasis added). This does not, however, explain why the Court 
struck down ballot access requirements unrelated to money in cases such as Williams and 
Anderson. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 
23 (1968).  
 118. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 211, 223-24 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
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on voter IDs’ effects on indigent voters.119 Justice Breyer’s dissent  
applied a similar balancing standard, without expressly relying on 
Anderson and Burdick, focusing on the law’s impact on voters who 
are poor, elderly, or disabled.120   
 Despite the absence of a majority opinion, a majority of Justices in 
Crawford agreed on two key points. The first is that the constitution-
al standard drawn from Anderson and Burdick applies in challenges 
to voter ID laws, and presumably other barriers to voting. At least 
eight and possibly all nine Justices agree on this point.121 Second, a 
majority of Justices (those joining the lead opinion and dissents) 
agree that courts should balance the character and magnitude of the 
burden on voters against the precise interests put forward by the 
State.122 For these Justices, the impact of the law on a definable 
group of voters is germane to defining its character. Because the 
Crawford plaintiffs focused on voter ID’s impact on poor people, that 
is the group on which the Justices’ opinions primarily focus. Yet 
these opinions leave open the possibility—and the lead opinion 
strongly suggests—that the impact on adherents of a non-dominant 
political party might also be relevant.  
 There is a major difference between Crawford and previous cases I 
have discussed. Unlike the precedents upon which it relies, Crawford 
was based solely on the right to vote under the Equal Protection 
Clause, not the right of association under the First Amendment. 
Constitutional cases concerning voting barriers since Crawford have 
likewise been litigated and decided primarily if not exclusively as 
right-to-vote cases. Examples include two cases from Ohio decided 
during the 2012 election season. The first case, Northeast Ohio Coali-
tion for the Homeless v. Husted,123 challenged a state rule requiring 
the rejection of provisional ballots cast in the correct polling place but 
the wrong precinct—often referred to as “right church, wrong pew” 
ballots—due to poll worker error. Plaintiffs sought relief under the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction re-
quiring that these ballots be counted, focusing its analysis on the 
burden Ohio’s rule imposed on voters who are not directed to the  
                                                                                                                                       
 119. Id. at 212, 220.  
 120. Id. at 237-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 121. Justice Breyer may not be in agreement; however, he seems to apply the Ander-
son-Burdick standard without expressly citing those cases.  
 122. That majority includes the three Justices signing on to the lead opinion (Justice 
Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy) along with the three dissenters  
(Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). Crawford, 553 U.S. at 181-83.  
 123. 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s prelim-
inary injunction as to provisional ballots with a deficient affirmation. Id. at 599-60. 
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correct precinct.124 The other case is Obama for America v. Husted,125 
a challenge to Ohio’s rule allowing only military and overseas voters 
to use in-person early voting during the last three days prior to the 
election. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction in 
that case as well, finding that the unequal treatment of voters likely  
violated the Equal Protection Clause.126 Both cases were thus litigat-
ed as Fourteenth Amendment voting cases, not First Amendment 
association cases.   
 The Sixth Circuit cases are typical of post-Crawford cases chal-
lenging state voting rules.127 Plaintiffs have primarily based their 
claims on the Equal Protection Clause, sometimes adding a claim 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.128 They 
have generally not included First Amendment claims in their com-
plaints. An exception is Veasey v. Perry, a challenge to Texas’ voter 
ID requirement in which plaintiffs alleged violations of the First 
Amendment as well as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.129 That case, however, is unusual. The 
general rule has been for plaintiffs to ground their claims exclusively 
on the right to vote and not the right of association—despite the  
Supreme Court’s recognition that voting is association protected by 
the First Amendment.130     
 In summary, the Court has long recognized the linkage between 
the right to expressive association and the right to vote under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It first rec-
ognized that linkage in cases involving minor party and independent 
candidates’ access to the ballot, later extending it to cases in which 
the dominant major party imposes burdens on the other major party. 
                                                                                                                                       
 124. Id. at 591-99.  
 125. 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 126. Id. at 428-36.  
 127. For citations to some of those cases, see supra notes 3-5.  
 128. See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) (challenging voter ID law 
under Equal Protection Clause and Voting Rights Act); Hunter v. Hamilton Co. Bd. of Elec-
tions, 635 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 2011) (challenging disparities in treatment of provisional 
ballots on due process and equal protection grounds); N.C. State Conf. NAACP v. McCrory, 
2016 WL 204481 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (challenging voter ID law under Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(asserting equal protection claims, as well as claims under First Amendment, Fifteenth 
Amendment, Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and Voting Rights Act).  
 129. 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 684-85 (S.D. Tex. 2014). A panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s injunction against Texas’ law based on section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, thus allowing it to avoid passing judgment on this constitutional claim. Veasey v.  
Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 493 (5th Cir. 2015). The Fifth Circuit took the case en banc, affirm-
ing the district court’s conclusion that the law violated section 2, without reaching the is-
sue whether it imposed an unconstitutional burden under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Veasey v. Abbott, No. 14-41127, 2016 WL 3923868 (5th Cir. July 20, 2016) 
(en banc). 
 130. See supra pp. 771-75. 
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Anderson developed a balancing test for voting-association cases, 
subsequently refined in Burdick. In Crawford and subsequent lower 
court cases, however, the connection between the right to vote and 
the right to expressive association was severed. Constitutional chal-
lenges to burdens on voting have mostly been litigated under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the First 
Amendment right of association. The consequence has been to shift 
the focus away from the challenged laws’ effects on different sub-
groups of voters, particularly those defined by party affiliation. Part 
IV argues for recovery of the voting-association link.  
IV.   RECONNECTING VOTING AND ASSOCIATION 
 Litigants and courts should rekindle the relationship between the 
constitutional rights of voting and association. Voting rights lawyers 
should allege violations of the First Amendment right of association 
in cases challenging burdens on voting such as ID requirements, re-
strictions on voter registration, and limitations on early voting. 
Courts entertaining these cases should focus on the disparate effect 
of these practices on different political groups. While disparate effects 
on racial groups, people with disabilities, and economic status are 
important, political party association is especially important. Accord-
ingly, voting rights lawyers should present proof of a disparate im-
pact on voters inclined to support the non-dominant party, and courts 
should consider this evidence in determining whether a given burden 
is “discriminatory” in character, thus demanding a higher burden of 
justification from the State.  
 To be clear, I am not arguing for abandonment of the voting-
association doctrine recognized in Williams, defined in Anderson, 
clarified in Burdick, and applied to voting burdens in Crawford. I am 
instead calling for refinement of that doctrine. The Anderson-Burdick 
balancing test effectively captures the need for courts to focus on not 
only the “magnitude” of the restriction, but also its “character.” While 
magnitude includes both the number of voters affected and the  
degree of burden on the individual voter, the character of the burden 
includes its discriminatory impact on particular subgroups of voters. 
It also captures the necessity of scrutinizing the specific interests 
proffered by the State in support of its restrictions, with stronger  
interests required to justify greater burdens.  
 The major problem with the Anderson-Burdick standard, as ap-
plied in voting cases since Crawford, is that it’s unclear exactly what 
the inquiry into the “character” of the burden should entail. Anderson 
explicitly made discrimination relevant to the inquiry, but lower 
courts have struggled to figure out what kind of discrimination—
specifically, discrimination against whom—is most significant. Dif-
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ferent plaintiffs and judges have considered the impact on various 
groups of voters, including poor people, racial minorities, homeless 
people, people with disabilities, and elderly voters. In contrast to the 
voting-association cases from which the Anderson-Burdick standard 
derives, post-Crawford courts have not looked directly at the chal-
lenged practice’s partisan impact.  
 The primary cost of forgetting the link between voting and associ-
ation has been to lose focus on political parties. That focus was cen-
tral to the line of decisions from which the Anderson-Burdick stand-
ard emerged. Why should political party be relevant in measuring 
the character of a voting restriction? The simple answer is that par-
ties are the primary means through which democratic politics is or-
ganized, a reality long recognized by the voting-association cases in 
the Anderson line. What these cases have in common is the dominant 
party’s adoption of rules that disadvantage voters supporting a non-
dominant party or faction. Elected officials at the federal and state 
level almost always come to office through the nomination of their 
political party. Most voters register and vote as members of a party, 
while even independent voters tend to align with one major party or 
the other on a consistent basis.131 Party identity has become increas-
ingly intense in the current age of hyperpolarized politics, not only 
among elected officials but also among voters.132   
 To be sure, political parties are amorphous and multifarious enti-
ties, as political scientists have long understood. Over a half-century 
ago, V.O. Key characterized parties as comprising three distinct 
groups: the party-in-government, the party leadership, and the party-
in-the-electorate.133 Contemporary scholarship recognizes that it is 
even more complicated than that. A recent article by Joey Fishkin 
and Heather Gerken sums it up nicely: “[A] party today is best un-
derstood as a loose coalition of diverse entities, some official and 
                                                                                                                                       
 131. BRUCE E. KEITH ET AL., THE MYTH OF THE INDEPENDENT VOTER 4 (1992); PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: HOW INCREASING 
IDEOLOGICAL UNIFORMITY AND PARTISAN ANTIPATHY AFFECT POLITICS, COMPROMISE AND 
EVERYDAY LIFE 18 (2014), http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-
Polarization-Release.pdf. 
 132. There is vast literature on the subject of political polarization in the United 
States. For examples, see ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED 
CITIZENS, POLARIZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2010); Gary C. Jacobson, Party  
Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral Connection, in POLARIZED POLITICS: 
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA (Jon R. Bond & Richard Fleisher eds., 
2000); SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015); 
SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008); Richard H. Pildes, Why the 
Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. 
REV. 273, 276-81 (2011). 
 133. V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 163-65 (4th ed. 1958). 
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some not, organized around a popular national brand.”134 Now more 
than ever, the major political parties are complex and fluid  
entities with lots of moving parts. Recognition of this reality does 
nothing to diminish the centrality of parties in organizing democratic 
politics and defining our political identities as citizens, voters, candi-
dates, and officeholders. While party leadership may be weak, party 
attachment is stronger than ever.135 
 Putting political parties at the center of the constitutional inquiry 
is therefore justified under both precedent and present-day reality. 
Equally important, a focus on political parties would also best cap-
ture the injury that underlies plaintiffs’ claims. The primary reason 
for concern with present-day restrictions on voting is that they are 
thinly disguised efforts at partisan manipulation, designed to help 
the dominant major party at the expense of its main competitor.136 
This is true not only of voter ID laws, but also restrictions on voter 
registration, early voting, and provisional voting that have since 
emerged as major issues. As the district judge in Crawford aptly put 
it, “[T]his is a partisan controversy that has spilled into the courts.” 
That is an accurate description of Crawford and many of the lower 
court cases since then. The lesson is not that courts should shy away 
from deciding such cases, but that they should directly address the 
partisan effects of the challenged practices. Their failure to do so is a 
direct consequence of forgetting the link between voting and  
associational rights.  
 For scholars and students of election law, the suggestion that con-
stitutional litigation should be viewed through the prism of inter-
party struggles may seem painfully obvious. The backdrop against 
which this litigation occurs, after all, is almost always a state’s domi-
nant party enacting rules that make it more difficult for supporters 
of the opposing party to vote. Advocates of a “structural” approach to 
elections have long focused on barriers to fair competition,137 while 
advocates of rights-based approaches also recognize the need for close 
judicial scrutiny of party-based discrimination.138 While part of the 
backdrop, that is not how these cases have been litigated up until 
                                                                                                                                       
 134. Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over: McCutcheon, Shadow 
Parties, and the Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 187 & n.45 (2014) 
(citing literature).  
 135. Id. at 183, 187.  
 136. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Epilogue: Bush v. Gore and the Constitu-
tional Right to Vote 7, 10 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 13-05, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2227062.  
 137. The leading example is the influential work of Issacharoff & Pildes, supra  
note 101.  
 138. Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican 
Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 
58, 70 (2014). 
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now. Litigants and courts have not focused directly on partisan dis-
parate impact. Recognition of the associational rights implicated by 
voting cases would allow courts to focus on the real harm, the domi-
nant political party disadvantaging supporters of its main rival.   
 My colleague Ned Foley has made a similar point, arguing that 
the constitutional inquiry should focus on whether voting rules are 
efforts at partisan manipulation.139 But Professor Foley suggests that 
the Anderson-Burdick balancing be jettisoned entirely, favoring an 
approach that would expressly look to whether the challenged prac-
tice is “a ploy to achieve partisan advantage.”140 I agree with his 
recognition of the underlying problem, though not with his proposed 
elimination of the established constitutional standard. Professor Fo-
ley’s new test suggests that courts focus on legislature’s partisan in-
tent, while the clarification of the Anderson-Burdick I recommend 
would focus on partisan impact. My approach is more consistent with 
precedent, specifically the Anderson-Burdick-Crawford line of cases, 
which focus on effect rather than an intent to disadvantage political 
parties, while avoiding the difficulties that inevitably accompany in-
tent- or purpose-based inquiries.141 It is also more practical. After all, 
partisan considerations are always—without exception—in play 
when political actors adopt a voting rule. Deciding how much of par-
tisan purpose is too much is an impossible question. Perhaps most 
significant, Professor Foley’s proposed standard would put courts in 
the uncomfortable position of having to accuse the dominant party of 
partisan manipulation to find a constitutional violation. Judges may 
occasionally be willing to go out on this limb,142 but it is neither rea-
sonable nor conducive to healthy inter-branch relations to require 
that they do so, even if it were a manageable inquiry.   
 An effects-based balancing standard, moreover, is better calibrat-
ed to address the competing interests that are almost invariably in 
play in cases involving burdens on the vote. On one side are the neg-
ative effects that a given practice will have on voters favoring a non-
dominant party. The greater the disparate impact on voters affiliated 
with the non-dominant party, the stronger the State’s justification 
                                                                                                                                       
 139. Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1836, 1861 (2013).  
 140. Id. 
 141. For an excellent analysis of the problem in a different context, specifically equal 
protection claims inquiring into whether race is the predominant factor in redistricting, see 
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don’t Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering 
Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1998). 
 142. A rare example is the dissenting opinion of Judge Evans from the Seventh  
Circuit’s decision upholding Indiana’s voter ID law in Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board, 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J., dissenting) (“Let’s not beat around the 
bush: The Indiana voter photo ID law is a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage  
election-day turnout by certain folks believed to skew Democratic.”).  
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should be. A refined version of the Anderson-Burdick-Crawford 
standard—one that puts partisan effects at the center of the analy-
sis—is not only faithful to the voting-association precedents de-
scribed in Part II, but it does the best job reconciling the competing 
interests involved in these cases. Balancing tests invariably involve 
some degree of indeterminacy, but not necessarily more than intent-
based inquiries. The hard truth is that no bright-line rule will effec-
tively address the concern with dominant parties adopting election 
laws that disadvantage their competitors. Any standard, whether 
focused on intent or effects, will be dependent on the evidence ad-
duced in discovery and at trial, making it inherently difficult to pre-
dict the outcome in advance. That is as it should be. A balancing test 
that considers the disparate impact on voters favoring non-dominant 
parties will address this concern while taking into account the legit-
imate competing interests that voting cases implicate.   
 This is not to deny that other group associations may also be rele-
vant under the Anderson-Burdick balancing standard. Of these, the 
most salient is race. That is partly because of the country’s long and 
ugly history of racial exclusion, exemplified by the NAACP cases 
from which the right of association emerged.143 While not formally a 
political party, the NAACP functioned like one in some respects, 
challenging the firm grip on power held by the dominant faction, the 
all-white Democratic Party. The exclusion of voters based on their 
race or ethnicity is not solely of historical concern. As Professor 
Charles has documented, race remains central to political identity 
today.144 And minority voters, especially African Americans and Lati-
nos, but also Asian Americans, lean strongly Democratic.145 The 
Democratic voting preferences of most racial minorities provide a 
strong incentive for Republicans, when they control the levers of 
power, to improve their own electoral preferences by enacting laws 
that disproportionately exclude these groups. It is difficult—and 
practically meaningless—to ask whether race or party predominates 
where there is a high correlation between the two.146 Elected officials 
of one party may very well be pursuing partisan ends by excluding 
minority voters who consistently support the other. While this phe-
nomenon may seem most likely when Republicans are in power, it is 
at least conceivable that Democrats might also engage in such 
                                                                                                                                       
 143. See supra notes 24-27, 33-35 and accompanying text.  
 144. Charles, supra note 17, at 1232.  
 145. Id. at 1233-35; Hasen, supra note 138, at 62.  
 146. Hasen, supra note 138, at 61-62.  
2016]  VOTING IS ASSOCIATION 789 
 
exclusion with respect to minority sub-groups that lean Republi-
can.147 Either way, the racially disparate impact of the law is relevant 
because it is closely related to its partisan effects.  
  On this point, I suggest a different emphasis than Professor 
Charles, the author of the most comprehensive analysis of the rela-
tionship between voting and associational rights to date. While Pro-
fessor Charles emphasized racial identity as a basis for association,148 
I view parties as central because they are the primary associations 
through which we organize politically. This is not to deny that racial-
ly focused association groups (like the NAACP) are critical at certain 
places and times and may play a role very similar to parties. Nor is it 
to deny the possibility that the dominant racial group within a politi-
cal party might try to diminish the clout of a minority racial group 
with the same party, warranting judicial intervention. But we no 
longer live in a world where racial minorities are excluded from polit-
ical parties. The racial impact of a law is germane to its partisan in-
tent and effect. In places with a high degree of racial polarization, the 
two are likely to be highly correlated. But the primary unit of analy-
sis under the voting-association doctrine upon which this Article is 
focused should be party.   
 How would this play out in practice? The basic framework would 
be the same one that lower courts have applied since Crawford, re-
quiring that the “character and magnitude” of the voting restriction 
be weighed against the “precise interest” proffered by the State. 
Courts would still consider the “magnitude” of the burden, including 
the number of voters affected and the degree to which each affected 
individual is burdened. The main difference would be an explicit 
recognition that a central component of the “character” of the burden 
is the impact on members of a non-dominant political party. For a 
voting rule adopted by Republicans, courts would look at its negative 
effect on Democratic voters; for a rule adopted by Democrats, courts 
would look at its negative effect on Republicans.149 This question has 
                                                                                                                                       
 147. For example, Cuban Americans and Vietnamese Americans lean Republican,  
although by narrower margins in the last election. See Jens Manuel Krogstad, After Dec-
ades of GOP Support, Cubans Shifting Toward the Democratic Party, PEW RESEARCH  
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(5th Cir. 2009).   
 148. Charles, supra note 17, at 1231-39, 1279.  
 149. The latter category may seem less common, but there have been some instances in 
which Democrats have been accused of adopting rules that disadvantage Republicans. One 
example is Virginia’s treatment of military and overseas voters during the 2008 election, 
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lurked in the background in post-Crawford voting rights cases, but 
plaintiffs have rarely put forward direct evidence of a disparate im-
pact on voters associated with the non-dominant party. Under the 
Anderson-Burdick balancing standard, the larger the partisan dis-
parity, the heavier the State’s burden to justify the disparity. The 
analysis of state interests would be the same as under current law 
with fraud prevention, voter confidence, and administrative conven-
ience among those that courts should consider. The more severe the 
burden—particularly its disparate impact on the non-dominant par-
ty—the heavier the State’s burden of justification.  
 To this point, my consideration has been limited to the effect  
that revitalization of the voting-association link would have on elec-
tion administration litigation. I close with a cautious suggestion  
regarding its potential impact on another highly contentious area  
of election law: partisan gerrymandering claims. In two cases last 
decade, a splintered Supreme Court rejected equal protection claims 
alleging excessive partisanship in drawing district lines.150 In Vieth v.  
Jubelirer, four Justices would have rejected the claim as a nonjusti-
ciable political question.151 The fifth vote to reject the claim was  
Justice Kennedy, who disagreed with the plurality’s reasoning on the 
political question issue, but rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed standard 
without specifying exactly what standard he thought should govern 
partisan gerrymandering claims.152 Justice Kennedy remained agnos-
tic on the constitutional standard in League of United Latin Ameri-
can Citizens v. Perry,153 joined on the fence by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Alito.154   
 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Vieth contained the intri-
guing suggestion that the First Amendment might provide a more 
promising basis for these claims than the Equal Protection Clause.155 
                                                                                                                                       
which was challenged by John McCain’s campaign. McCain-Palin 2008 v. Cunningham, 
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He specifically mentioned several First Amendment cases burdening 
voters on the basis of party association including Anderson, suggest-
ing a “pragmatic or functional assessment that accords some latitude 
to states.”156 Commentary on Justice Kennedy’s suggestion has most-
ly been critical, questioning whether partisan motivations can ever 
be excised completely from redistricting.157 But Justice Kennedy’s  
Vieth concurrence need not—and I think should not—be understood 
as requiring that redistricting be entirely free from partisan consid-
erations any more than the Anderson line of cases requires that  
voting rules be entirely free from partisan considerations. He  
is better understood as suggesting that future partisan gerrymander-
ing claimants focus on how great a burden the challenged plan  
imposes on the opposition, weighing that burden against the State’s  
proffered interests. Applying the Anderson-Burdick-Crawford balanc-
ing standard in the manner I have suggested here—with a special 
eye on the character and magnitude of the burden on non-dominant  
parties—might be the best approach to gerrymandering claims as 
well as barriers to the right to vote as such.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 For almost a half-century, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
link between the First Amendment right to expressive association 
and the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote. In the Anderson line of 
cases, it transformed this recognition into a manageable doctrine, 
requiring courts to balance the burdens imposed by the challenged 
practice against the State’s asserted interests. At the heart of this 
inquiry is the extent to which the challenged rule has a dispropor-
tionate effect on non-dominant political parties and independent 
candidates. Crawford imported Anderson’s standard into the realm of 
election administration, without expressly recognizing its connection 
to the First Amendment right of association. The cost of losing the 
voting-association connection is to obscure the central question 
whether the challenged voting practice advantages the dominant 
party by impeding participation by those likely to support its main 
rival. The time has come to restore the severed link between the con-
stitutional rights of voting and association. Doing so would not radi-
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cally alter the existing constitutional standard, but it would focus 
litigants and courts on the right question. 
 
